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ABSTRACT
Wecomputerates ofgrowthin laborproductivityduring the
1973—80period for samples of individualmanufacturingfirms, in bothJapan and the u.S., and relate them to differencesin the ratesof growth in their capital—laborratios andir! their
intensities of R&D effort. Japanese firms spent about as much of
their own money on R&D, relative to sales, as did similar U.S.
firms. An econometric analysis of R&D performing firms leads to
the acceptance of the hypothesis that thecontributionof such
expendituresto productivity growth was about the same in both
countries. Hence, the rather large differences ontheobserved ratesof productivitygrowthbetween the two countriescannotbe
accountedforby differences in either the intensity or fecundity
of such expenditures. We do findtwo important differences betweenthetwo countries which helptoexplain a significant
fractionofthe observeddifferences inproductivitybut require in turn, an explanationoftheir own:1)Japanese firmsreduced
their employment levels significantly during thisperiodwhile U5 firms wereincreasingtheirs This,by itself, accounts for
thetwice as fast growthin capital—laborratioin Japanese
manufacturing2) The estimated effect ofthe growth in the
capital—labor ratio onfirmproductivityisapproximately twice -as
largein Japan than in theUS.The two factors together can account forabouthalf of the observeddifferencesinthe average ratesofproductivity growthbetween the two countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In economic terms Japan is a large country with a large
internal market in addition to its export potential. In an
area that is one twenty—fifth of the U.S., it has a population
slightly over a half and a total GNP above one—third of the U.S.
Its manufacturing sector is somewhat larger relatively, total
employment in manufacturing being around 42 percent of that in
the U.S. One of the most important differences between the two
countries has been in their rates of productivity growth.
Although the oil crises o-f 1973 and 1979 affected both economies
severely and output and productivity growth slowed down in both
of them, the productivity of labor in manufacturing continued to
increase much faster in Japan than in the U.S. during the 1970s.
(Economic Report of the President, 1984, Table 3.3). These
events elicited many comments and studies but mostly at the
at the aggregate—macro level.Also, while there has been much
discussion of the possible involvement of R&D policies in the
two countries in these events, there has been little quantitative
examination of the R&D—productivity growth relationship and what
there has been has focused largely on aggregate data and single
country analysis.(l) It is our intention to look at these issues
1using Japanese and U. S. company data in attempt to assess the
contribution of R&D to productivity in both countries.
This paper can be viewed as a continuation of our previous
work on R&D and productivity growth at the firm level in the
U.S. and in France. In analyzing the data -forFrenchand U.S.
manufacturing we found that one cannot account for much of the
observed difference in the average rate of productivity growth
or in the distribution of these differences across industrial
sectors or firms by differences in their respective R&D efforts.
(See Griliches and Mairesse, 1983 and 1984; and Cuneo and
Ilairesse, 1984.) The availability of similar data for Japan
led us to extend these comparisons also to Japan and the U.S.,
where the contrasts are even larger.
Our work differs from much of the productivity comparisons
literature by taking the individual firm data as its primary
focus. Firm data have the virtue of providing us with much
more variance in the relevant variables and a more appropriate
level of analysis, the level at which most of our theories are
specified. By working with micro data we escape many of the
aggregation problems that plague macro economics. On the
other hand, these benefits do not come without' cost. Our data
bases rarely contain enough variables relevant to the specific
circumstances of a particular firm, and the available
variables themselves are subject to much higher relative error
rates, errors which are largely averaged out in aggregate
data.
The basic approach we follow in this paper is to compute
2simple productivity growth measures for individual manufacturing
firms both in Japan and the U.S for the relatively recent 1973--
1980 period and relate them to the differences in theintensity
of R&D effort. We start by describing our data sources and the
overall pattern of R&D spending in manufacturing in both
countries and by reviewing the major trends in productivity
growth across different industrial sectors. We then turn to the
discussion of a regression results which attempt to account for
the differences in labor productivity growth by the differences
in the growth of the capital—labor ratio and in theintensity of
R&D effort across different firms for total manufacturingas a
whole and also separately within specific industrial sectors.
Since, as we shall point out in some detail later on, the
Japanese R&D data at the firm level turn out to be especially
incomplete, we cannot provide a definitive solution to the
original puzzle of differential growth rates, but we still have
some interesting facts and several new puzzles to report.
II. COMPARING R&D EXPENDITURES
Before we look at our R&D data at the firm level, it is
useful to compare the industrial distribution of R&D expenditures
in both countries. In Tables 1A and 15 we present comparative
statistics on the magnitude and industrial distribution of R&D
expenditures for manufacturing in both countries, focusing on the
role of 'large' firms, firms with more than a 1000 employees. (2)
We look primarily at the large firms both because they account
for most of the R&D done in either country and because our micro
data concern them mainly.
3Comparing the two tables we can see that large firms are more
numerous in the U.S. and that on average they are also larger
(about 10 thousand employees versus 3.5 thousand in Japan). Large
firms account for 70 percent of total sales and 65 percent of total
employment in manufacturing in the U.S. versus 52 and 41 percent
respectively in Japan. Similarly, large firms do almost all of
the R&D in U.S., 94 percent, but only about three quarters in
Japan. (3)
Allowing for differences in the size of the countries and
the size distribution of firms, there is very little difference
either in the intensity or the sectoral distribution of company
financed R&D expenditures in the two countries. There is a big
difference, however, in the involvement of government in the
financing of R&D performed in manufacturing. In the U.S. over
a third of total R&D has been federally financed while in Japan
the state accounts for less than 2 percent of the total.(4)
Because our micro data pertain only to company financed R&D we
shall also restrict our discussion to it.
While in absolute terms large Japanese manufacturing
companies spend only about a third of the amount that U.S.
companies do on R&D, the ratios of these expenditures to their
sales are remarkably similar, about two percent in both countries.
So is also their sectoral distribution.(5) The distributions of
total company R&D by industry and of the intensity of R&D
effort are also very similar in the two countries. Most of the
R&D is done in three sectors: electrical equipment, transportation
equipment, and chemical industries. The highest R&D to sales
4ratios are to be found in the drug, electrialequipment, and
instrument industries, the only noticeable differencebeing
the somewhat higher relative expenditure in the instruments
industry in the US.
We turn now to the consideration of our firm—level data
sources., In both countries the responses to the official R&D
surveys are confidential and not publicly available. What is
available are reports on the R&D expenditures made by individual
firms as part of their public annual reports or filings withthe
respective securities markets regulatory authorities (10 K
statements in the U.S.). In Japan such data are collected and
organized by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun Corporation and are known
as the NEEDS data base. In the US. the equivalent is the
Compustat data base created by the Standard and Poors
Corporation. We have worked previously with the Compustat data
and have created a consistent panel data set based on it.(6)
This is our first experience with the NEEDS data, however, and
we had to invest heavily in cleaning them up and in trying to
understand their construction and provenance. Except for the
R&D numbers, as we shall see below, these data seem of
comparable quality to those of the U.S.
The general characteristics of the parallel firm samples
that we have constructed are depicted in Table 2. If we insist
oncontinuousdata from 1972 through 1980 with no major
mergers or major jumps in the series and require also consistent
reporting of R&D expenditures throughout this period we have
complete data for about 'p00 R&D firms in Japan and slightly
over 500 RD firms in the US.(7) The U.S. firms are
5significantly larger, by a factor of four on average. They
also seem to be doing much more R&D, even relatively.
Here we stumble on our major difficulty with the NEEDS data.
The R&D data appear to be badly underreported in thi5 source.
If we compare the numbers in Table 1A with thosein Table 1B,
we observe that the overall company financed R&D to Sales
ratio is roughly similar in both countries and only slightly
lower in Japan (1.9 vs. 2.3 percent in the U.S. for large
R&D performing firms) while the numbers in Table 2 imply
that the U.S. firms are twice as R&D intensive.
It does not take very long to convince oneself that indeed
the NEEDS data are heavily deficient in their R&D coverage.
Table 3 reports coverage ratios for 1981 of the NEEDS R&D
numbers relative to the official Japanese R&D Survey. While
the large firms in the NEEDS sample account for close to 80
percent of the relevant employment and sales totals, the
coverage of R&D expenditures is only slightly above a
third.(8) Looking at the distribution by industrial sector
we see that coverage is good to reasonable for the chemical,
drugs and instruments industries, but that it is abysmal for
motor vehicles and transportation equipment and poor for the
rest of manufacturing. The magnitude of the problem can be
appreciated when it is realized that neither Toyota, Hitachi,
Nissan or Honda report positive R&D expenditures in the NEEDS
data base.
Using information published by the OECD (1984) on the 20
largest R&D performers in Japan in 1979 we find that of the 18
firms that should be within our definition of manufacturing and
6are indeed in the NEEDS file, 10 report no R&D whatsoever, three
report about the same amount of R&D in both sources, and, what
may be even more worrisome, five companies report significantly
less R&D in the NEEDS data base than is reportedby the OECD.
For example, the reported R&D expenditures of theSony Corporation
differ by a factor of two in these different sources,. If the
OECD information is added to the NEEDS data set, total R&D
expenditures come close to doubling and the coverage ratio rises
to a respectable 73 percent. Thus the problemwe face is not
only that R&D is missing for some firms, that we could either
ignore or adjust for in some way, but that the reportedfigures
themselves appear to be inaccurate. They reflect notonly
real differences in this variable but also differences in
reporting practices. Since there was nothing else that we could
do at this point we complemented or adjusted the R&Dfigures
for the 18 very large R&D firms for which we had OECD
information and proceeded to analyze these data as ifthey
actually mean what they say. The best we can hope for is
that the reported R&D numbers are still acceptableproxies
for the true figures (9). We will come back, however, to
this issue in interpreting the results of ouranalyses.
A few words should be said also at this point about the
U.S. R&D data. They seem indeed better. Even thoughthey are
not exactly conceptually equivalent, the 10K basedreports and
the NSF collected numbers are not very far apart,especially as
far as industry totals are concerned. A recentanalysis by the
NSF (1985) of data for the 200 largest R&D performers findsthe
7totals in 1981 remarkably close, within 3 percent, though this
covers up significant individual variability. Forty—seven
percent of the firms reported totals within 10 percent in both
sources, 22 percent were within 10 to 25 percent and only 13
percent were off by more than 25 percent. Eighteen percent
were not included in the Compustat based data base, primarily
because they were either privately or foreign owned. Using 1976
totals and adjusting for differences in definition and coverage,
we ourselves estimated that the Compustat based universe
contained about 85 percent a-f total R&D reported to the NSF,
the major discrepancy arising from the above mentioned absence
o-f privately and foreign owned firms in these data.(10) At
the same time, our selection of "continuous R&D" firms
preserves about 80 percent of the total R&D reported in the
1976 large Compustat cross—section. Thus, roughly speaking,
the firms contained in our U.S. sample account for about 70
percent of the total company financed R&D as reported to the
National Science Foundation.
III. COMPARING TRENDS IN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Bearing in mind the limitations of the R&D data, we look
now at the productivity record of the firms in our samples for
both countries during the l970s. Table 4 lists the sample
sizes, averages, and standard deviations for some of our major
variables by industrial sector and for manufacturing as a whole.
The construction of the major variables is similar for both
countries except that in the U.S. we were able to use 3—digit
SIC level deflators and business segment information to construct
8individual firm sales deflators while for Japan we had touse
general B—digit level deflators.(l1) In both countries thegross
plant figures were converted from historical to constantprices
using the information contained in the net versusgross plant
distinctjon..(12) In neither data set do we have informationon
hours worked, and materials purchases are only available for
Japan. (13)
There are a number of interesting observations to bemade
on the basis of Tables 4A and B, some less obvious than others.
The major contrast between the two countries is in the
employment story and the associated productivity movements. In
Japan total employment declined on the average in 8 out of the 9
industrial groupings. In the U.S. it rose in all sectors. In
fact, real output per firm as measured by deflated salesgrew
at about the same rate in the U.S. as in Japan, 3.5percent per
year on average, the big difference in the productivity numbers
coming essentially from the behavior of the employment series.
The same thing is also true for the growth in thecapital—labor
ratio, which grew twice as fast in Japan than in the U.S.,
while the capital stock was growing at roughly similar rates in
both countries during this same period. What is alsointeresting
in both countries is that the growth of the capital—labor ratio
was very similar for the different industrial groupings, varying
much less than the growth in the output—labor ratio. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that the real wage—capital user
cost ratio moved differently in the two countries butessentially
similarly for the different industries within these countries.
9If one looks at the estimate of total fartor productivity
growth that one gets by assuming a common capital input weight
of .25 for all firms in both countries onefindsseveral
commonalities and also same contrasts. In both countries the
high R&D industries 5plit in their productivity experience:
electric equipment and instruments have the highest productivity
growth rates while chemicals are among the lowest ones.The
major contrasts occur in the machinery, transportation
equipment and drugs industries where there was significant
productivity growth in Japan but not in the U.S.(l') Only in
the -food industry did the U.S. do significantly better than
Japan as far as total factor productivity growth is concerned.
One cannot compare these numbers directly to similar macro
estimates, both because the numbers we report are unweighted
firm averages and because in both countries many of the firms are
multi—nationals with neither their employment nor productivity
restricted entirely to the country of origin. Nevertheless, the
fragmentary macro evidence that we have examined to date is not
inconsistent with these findings. For example, Jorgenson and
Fraumeni (1985) find that the TFP growth between 1973 and 1979
was among the highest in the electrical equipment industry in
the U.S. and among the lowest in the chemical industry as is
also true for the Japanese data examined by Jorgenson, Kuroda,
and Nishimizu (1985).
IV. R&D INTENSITY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AT THE FIRM LEVEL
The model we consider can be thought of as a modified
10version of the Cobb—Douglas production function in itsgrowth
rate form, with labor productivity being a function of the
physical capital—labor ratio and research capital. Because e
have only a very short history of research expenditures for
most of these firms it is difficult to construct a reliable
research capital measure. We use, therefore, the R&D
intensity version of this model instead, substituting the
beginning period R&D to sales ratio for the unavailable R&D
capital variable.(15)
Let the true equation be
(q—2) =A+ c(c-2) + yk + u
where small lettered variables stand for rates of growth of
logarithmic changes; q, £ ,andc represent output, employment,
and physical capital respectively;, 1< is a measure of accumulated
research capital; c ,, yare the elasticies of output with
respect to physical capital, labor and research capital.
=1— —, Ais a constant which reflects among
other things disembodied technical change, and u isa,
hopefully, random disturbance standing in for all other
unspecified effects affecting measured productivity growth.
The research capital elasticity y is equal by definition to
(dQ/dK)*(K/Q) and k is dKIK. We can then simplify the Y*k
term to r*(R/Q), where r=dQfdK is the marginal product of
research capital and R is the level of R&D expenditures.
Two points need to be made about this type of simplification:
Firstly, it is assumed that R is a good proxy for net investment
in R&D capital. This can be only true i-f there is no or little
11depreciation of research capital or if we are in the
beginning phases of accumulation and the initial stocks of K
are small. Secondly, it is assumed that r rather than
y is constant across firms, that is, the elasticity 'is
variable but that the rate of return r is the parameter that
is more or less equalized across firms.(16)
The equations that we estimate are then the form
(q—2)= X +(c—i) +p2+r(R/Q) + u
wherethe rates of growth of (y—), (c—fl, are generally
computed for the seven year period 1973—80. Several
alternative measures of R/Q were tried with largely
similar results. The final variable chosen AR/S relates the
average amount of deflated R&D during 1972—1974 to the mean
(geometric) levels of deflated sales for the period as a whole
(average of 1973 and 1980 sales). The numerator of this ratio
relates to the beginning of the period and allows, implicitly,
for an approximate three year lag in the effects of R&D.(17)
The denominator is positioned in the middle of the period to
reduce the spuriousness which may arise when a growth rate is
related to a ratio whose denominator is in fact the initial level
from which the growth rate is measured(l8) Instead of a unique
trend term we include, usually, separate industry dummy variables
which allow for differential industrial trends of disembodied
technical change, and also for deflator errors and industry
wide changes in capacity utilization. Such equations were
also estimated separately for each industrial grouping.
Table 5 summarizes our main econometric results. The
12estimated R&D coefficients in the productivity grOwth
equations are of similar magnitude in both countries. The
major difference is that once separate industry trends are
allowed for, this coefficient for Japan is notstatistically
significant at conventional significance levels. In both
countries, the coefficient of the R&D variable falls
substantially when industry dummies (trends) are allowed for,
implying, possibly, the presence of significant inter—firm R&D
spillovers. On the other hand, the contribution of the R&D
variable to the explanation of the variance inproductivity
growth across firms is rather small, the fit barely improving
in the second decimal place. Nor can R&D account for themean
difference in growth rates between the two countries. Both
the average R&D intensities and the estimated coefficients
are quite close to each other. Nevertheless, if these
coefficients are taken at face value, they imply that R&D
contributed on the average between 0.4 and 0.6 percentper
year to productivity growth in both countries. Not a small
matter after all.
What is most striking in our results is the lower
estimated contribution of physical capital to outputgrowth in
the U.S. It is about half of what is estimated forJapan. In
fact, if we apply the coefficients in Table 5 (regression 3)
to the first row of Table 4, we can account for about half of
the Japan—U.S. difference in productivity growth by the twice
as fast rate of growth of the capital—labor ratio in Japan and
its twice as large effect on productivity there. Thereasons
13for both of these remain to be elucidated.(19) On the other
hand, the Japanese data seem also to imply a much sharper rate
of diminishing returns. This last estimate (the —.24 coefficient
in regression 5) seems rather difficult to believe; it could
be due to errors in the Japanese labor variable or to our
inability to take properly the problem of varying capacity
utilization and hours of work properly into account. In any
case, since the Japanese firms reduced their average employment
during this period such "diminishing returns" could not serve
as a brake on their productivity growth..
Table 6 summarizes our attempts to look at the same
issues for the individual industries. Given the high error
rates in the data at the firm level and the relatively small
sample sizes there is little to be seen there. Consistent
with our earlier finding of an overall not statistically
significant R&D coefficient in Japan, the individual industry
estimates are about half positive and half negative and only
three of them have both the right sign and exceed their
estimated standard error. In the U.S. data matters are only
slightly better: seven out of the nine industries have
positive R&D coefficients and four of them are larger than
their estimated standard errors. There is little
relationship, however, in the relative size of these
coefficients across the the same industry groupings in the
two countries (see Panel S of Table 6>.
We made several efforts to improve matters by redefining
variables and changing the time periods somewhat but to litte
effect. The results are quite robust to the use of net rather
14than gross physical capital measures or to changes in the
averaging procedures for the R&D data.. Changing time periods,
however, makes more of a difference. Using the slightly
shorter 1974—79 period improves matters somewhat in Japan
but deteriorates them in the U.S. This leads us to a
disappointing finding: the instability of the productivity—
R&D relationship and its sensitivity to the business cycle and
macro supply shocks..
Table 7 presents annual estimates of the R&D coefficients
using approximate TFP growth as the dependent variable. We
use TFP here to avoid adding another source of variation which
would come from allowing also the physical capital elasticity
to vary from year to year.(20) What is striking is that in
both countries the oil shock induced sharp recession of 1974—5
hit the R&D intensive firms disportionately hard, though the
exact timing was a bit different in the two countries.. It is
not clear, however, whether what we see in this table
represents a real phenomenon or is just another reflection of
the thinness of our data and our inability to estimate such
effects precisely..
V. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Japanese manufacturing firms spent about as much of their
own money on R&D, relative to their sales, as did similar U.S.
firms; about 1.9 versus 2.3 percent respectively in 1976. On
the basis of the econometric analysis of our sample of R&D
firms we cannot reject the hypothesis that the contribution of
15these expenditures to productivity growth was about the same
in both countries. Hence there is no indication that
differences in either the intensity or the fecundity of R&D
expenditures can account for the rather large difference in
the observed rates of growth of productivity between the two
countries.(21) The reasons for this difference must be looked
for elsewhere.
We do find two important differences between Japan and the
U.S. which help to account for some a-f this difference but
require an explanation oftheirown:
1.In spite of their success in growing and exporting,
Japanese firms reduced their employment levels significantly
during this period while U.S. firms were increasing theirs. This
alone is enough to account for the twice as fast growth in the
capital—labor ratio in Japanese manufacturing since the capital
stock itself has been growing at roughly similar rates in both
countries.
2. For not well understood reasons, the estimated effect
of growth in the capital—labor ratio on firm productivity in
manufacturing appears to be twice as large in Japan than in the
U.S. An exploration a-f the reasons for this difference awaits
better data, another occasion, and perhaps a different approach
to the problem.
There are a number of other puzzling findings which we
hope to return to in the future: Why did the chemical industry
perform so badly during this period in both countries? Why
did the drug industry do so badly in the U.S. during these
same years?Is this a real fact or an artifact of poor
16deflators? While the oil—price shocks provide some
explanation for the poor performance of the chemical firms
along lines outlined by Bruno and Sachs (1985) it is doubtful
that they can also explain the experience of the
pharmaceutical firms in the U.S. Why does the effect of R&D
intensity on productivity growth vary so much over the cycle?
Is it because it should only be observable at ornear full
capacity? How can such consideration be incorporated into a
more complete analysis of our data?
An improved analysis of the role of R&D expenditures in
the growth of Japanese firms will require better data than is
currently available to us. The Japanese Statistics Office has
collected much more extensive and presumably more reliable data
on R&D expenditures of firms for many years but as far as we
know these data have not been accessible, nor havethey been
used in their detailed micro form. In the U.S.similarly
collected data by NSF—Census have been matched for different
surveys and brought together in a usable data file. The
confidentiality problem was solved by performing all of the
major data assembly and cleaning operations within the Census
and by releasing only variance—covariance matrices for the
major variables across firms and years without disclosing any
individual firm information.(22) It would be certainly
interesting to launch a similar effort in Japan. Another
way of dealing with the confidentiality requirement is to
carry out the econometric analysis within the National
Statistical Office itself, as was the case for our studies
17for France.(23)
We cannot expect, however, that having better and more
reliable data will solve all the problems What we are looking
for are effects which are at best variable, uncertain and more or
less long term in nature, and which are also relatively small in
magnitude. This does not mean, of course, that these effects are
unimportant or that we should not devote more effort in trying to
analyze them. ut we cannot expect to account for much of the
observed growth in productivity by focusing only on the firm's
own R&D investments. The role of research spiliovers between
-firms, sectors and countries and the impact of other, less
formal, ways of generating technical progress, are both likely
to be quite large and remain still to be measured.
18*We are indebted to T. Tachibanaki for providing us with the
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help with Japanese price indexes, to 1. Abbott and M. Sassenou
for very able research assistance, and to the National Science
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1. One exception at the macro level is Mohnen, Nadiri and
Prucha, 1984. After this paper was written we became aware also
ofthework of Odagiri, 1983, and Odagiri and Iwata, 1985, whouse
the same Japanese data base to construct value—added based TFP
growth measures and relate them to firm R&D intensities.
Their results for Japan are similar to ours but they do not make
cross country comparisons, however.
2. These numbers come from the national R&Dsurveys conducted
by the Statistics Bureau in the Prime Ministers Office in Japan and
the National Science Foundation in the United States.
3. Some of this contrast may be an artifact of different
reporting conventions in the two countries. A perusal of the
individual firm data seems to indicate that there is less
consolidation in Japan, with more units which in the U.S.
would be treated as subsidiaries appearing as independent
firms in the Japanese sources.
4. See Peck, 1985, for more discussion of this difference.
5. Because we try to have reasonably sized samples in the
various "industries," we have aggregated some of the more
19detailed available statistics into nine industrial "sectors."
Thus, sector 2 includes chemical and rubber firms, but not
pharmaceutical ones, sector 6 includes computers, electrical
machinery, and electrical and communication equipment, while
sector 9 brings together the textile, paper, wood, glass, and
miscellaneous manufacturing industries. Petroleum refining is
excluded from our definition of "manufacturing."
6. See Bound et al, 1984 and Cummins at al, 1984 for a
discussion of the construction and description of this data set
which includes also a match to the Patent Office data on the
number of patents granted to these firms.
7. Because of the significant and intermittent non—reporting of
R&D one cannot assume that the other firms, the not included
ones, are truly "zero—R&D" firms. Thus one cannot separate our
samples clearly into R&D doing and non—R&D firms and compare the
results. This has only been possible in a study for France,
because it was conducted within the National Institute of
Statistics and we had access to the individual data 0f the French
R&D survey (see Mairesse and Cuneo, 1985).
8. The coverage ratios in Table 3 are for the most recent year
that we had data on in both the NEEDS and R&D surveys (1981) but
they are not much different in the earlier years. There has
been little improvement in R&D reporting in the NEEDS data base.
The coverage ratio for the large firms were 30 and 35 percent in
1976 and 1981 respectively. Firms that do report their R&D in
the NEEDS data base do so continuously and apparently on a
consistent basis.
209. Even i-f the total R&D levels are about right (after
correction) and comparable in the two countries, if the
individual observations are subject to much error and
differences in reporting practices (especially for the smaller
R&D performers), our subsequent regression based estimates of
the "importance" of R&D may be significantly biased downward
as the result of such errors.
10. See Bound et al, 1984, for more detail.
11. In previous work, we were able to verify that using 2—
digit de-flators in the case of the U.S.hadvery little effect on
the regression estimates.
12. See the appendix of Griliches and Mairesse (1984) formore
detail on the adjustment of the gross plant numbers for
inflation. Using alternative measures for physical capital had
little effect on our results.
13. For Japan we were able to experiment using a value added
instead of a sales based output measure. Although deflated value
added has grown much faster than deflated sales over the seven
years of our study period, our R&D related regressions results
did not change much.
14. Using a more appropriate price deflator for the drug
companies in Japan results in a significant rise in their
estimated productivity growth relative to the earlier version
of this paper but has no effect on regression results which
allow for separate industry constants.
15. A number of issues are ignored in this formulation, not
because they are unimportant, but primarily because there is
little that we can do about them in this context. Much of the
21Japanese progress may be based on imported technology.We have
no data on this. To the extent that R&D expenditures are
required to absorb borrowed or imported technology,this may
still be captured, in part, by our measures. We can also do
little about the role of government R&D support (there are no
data on this at the firm level in either data base) or
spillovers in this context. (See Griliches, 1979, for a
discussion of these and other caveats.)
14. See Griliches 1979, and Griliches and Lichtenberg 1984 for
a related discussion of such models.
17. We tried also shorter lags, i.e., defining the R&D measure
as of 1976, the middle of our period, with significantly worse
results in both Japan and the U.S. We could not really try
for longer lags within the framework of these data bases.
18. Using sales in 1973 or an average of 1972 and 1974 sales
as a base does indeed make our results look significantly
better. Using the R/673 (est) ratio Ne., 2R73/(S72 +674)]
in equation 5 of Table 5, for example, we get for its
coefficient .36 with a t—ratio 3 in Japan and .42 with a
t—ratio of 6 in the U.S. These are significantly higher than
the comparable numbers in Table 5. Since the R&D numerator is
the same in both measures, this does imply that our worries about
potential spuriousness may not be groundless.
19. The higher capital elasticity estimate in Japan is consistent
with the higher capital share in output reported by Jorgenson,
Kuroda and Nishimizu (1985).
20. The estimated physical capital elasticity also varies from
22year to year.. But since the physical capital growth ratio
and R&D intensity variables are nearlyuncorrelated, the
R&D coefficients are almost unaffectedby the constraining
of the capital coefficient implicit in the TFPequations.
21. Siven the high standard errors associatedwith the Japanese
estimates, they are also consistent with thepossibility that
such differences are indeed present and important.
22. See Griliches 1982 and 1984 and Grilichesand Hall 1982 for
more detail on these data and their construction and forresults
of analyses using them.
23. Since this was first written we have beeninformed that
such efforts are indeed underway by researchersassociated with
the Economic Planning Agency in Japan..
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—26—TABLE 1A
R&D Firms in Manufacturing:
The Relative Importance of Large Firms





Number of Company R&D
Employees Sales in Expenditures
in Millions 100 Billion 100 Billion Number
and Percent Yens and Yens and of R&D Sales
of Total Percent Percent Firms Ratio1
All Firms
R&D firms
8.8 1,244 15.14 85,650 .012
59 69 100 11,950 .018
Large firms 41 52 78 1,120 .018
Large R&D firms 39 50 78 1,030 .019
11.82 1,030 .019
1.








5.1 9.0 2.2 60 .005
2.Chemicals & rubber 11.0 14.2 16.6 98 .022
3.Drugs 2.3 2.1 5.8 29 .051
4.Primary & fabricated metals13.7 16.8 9.8 104 .012
5.Machinery 8.0 6.5 6.2 91 .018
6.Electrical equip. 19.1 14.0 30.4 123 .041
7.Transportation equip. 23.7 22.0 20.5 329 .018
8.Instruments 2.1 1.4 2.1 29 .028
9.Other 15.0 14.0 6.4 167
Notes:
Source: Report on the Survey of Research and Development -1976,Japan.
"Manufacturing" excludes petroleum refining.
1







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N 1032 394 406 968 525
Average Employment
thousands 2.7 3.4 4.5 13 17
Average Sales
million dollars 215 242 345 655 872
Average Plant,
million dollars 116 118 187 330 434
Average R&D,
million dollars 3.1 6.9 — 22.7
Average R&D/Sales
Ratio .012 .013 — .024
Notes:
1. From the NEEDS (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) database. Converted to dollars
at $1=300 yen.
2. In addition to the 394 continuously R&D reporting firms, in the Japanese
sample, there are also 338 firms which reported nonzero RD expenditures in
one or more years in the 1972-1980 period.
3. The data on largest R&D performing firms in Japan reported in OECD (1984)
were used to fill in some missing values and adjust others for apparent
underreporting.
4. In addition to the 525 continuously R&D reporting firms in the U.S. sample
with no major jumps, there are also 129 firms which reported nonzero R&D
expenditures in one or more years in the 1972-80 period.
5. Average of individual firm R&D to sales ratios.TABLE 3
Japan: NEEDS81 Relative to R&D Survey 81
Coverage in Percent of R&D Survey Totals
Firms Employees Sales R&D Expenditures
All 1.2 30 46 29
R&D reporting 4.2 35 38 29
Large firms
(1OOO employees)




45 51 49 35
1. Food & kindred 27 30 45 26
2. Chemicals & rubber 65 70 80 92
3. Drugs 71 92 95 98
4. Metals or products 60 55 70 42
5. Machinery 46 45 54 27
6. Electrical equip. 51 60 69 26
7. Transportation equip.38 44 38 14
8. Instruments 42 58 73 75
9. Other 42 48 53 29TABLE 4
Continuous R&D Reporting Firms Subsample
1973—80 Growth Rates (per year) and 1973 Levels







































2. Chemicals 82 3.0 .011 —.023 .026 .079 .006
& rubber (3.8) (.010) (.035) (.027) (.037) (.027)




































6. Electrical 67 7.2 .0161 —.017 .105 .087 .084
equip. (14.4) (.013) (.035) (.035) (.037) (.034)
7. Transport 33 12.3 .0091 -.006 .066 .084 .044

























Notes: Average Empi. 76 -Arithmeticaverage.
R/S 73 (est.) -1972through 1974 average deflated R&D divided by the average
of deflated sales in 1972 and 1974.
Approximate TFP (Total Factor Productivity) =growthin deflated sales per
employee -.25x growth in gross plant per employee.
1OECD data (for 1979) based corrections raise this number from.011 to .016 and
from .004 to .009 for electrical and transportation equipment industries
respectively. For the total sample, however, these corrections raise R/S only
by .001.TABLE 4 (Continued)
Continuous R&D Reporting Firms Subsample
1973-80 Growth Rates (per year) and 1973 Levels














































































































































Notes: Average Empl. 76 -Arithmeticaverage.
R/S 73 (est.) -1972through 1974 average deflated R&D divided by the average
of deflated sales in 1972 and 1974,
Approximate TFP (Total Factor Productivity) =growthin deflated sales per employee
-.25x growth in gross plant per employee.TABLE 5
Productivity (deflated sales per employee) growth in manufacturing
at the firm level as a function of growth in the capital-labor
ratio and R&D intensity: Japan-US Comparisons, 1973-80
N =Japan-406,U.S.—525
Regression
Coefficients and standard errors of R2
Japan u.s.






































Equations 3 through 5 contain an additional 13 industry dummy variables and
include also the average 1972-74 employment level as a control variable for
initial size. Its coefficient is small, positive and significant for the
U.S. and essentially zero for Japan.
C/L -growthrate of gross-plant in constant prices per employee. L -growthrate of employment.
AR/S -averageR&D to sales ratio. R&D averaged for the years 1972-4,
sales at mid-point of the period: geometric average of beginning
(1973) and end period (1980) sales. Both variables are deflated.
MSE -Meansquare error of regression residuals.TABLE 6
Distribution of the P/S
Coefficients by Industry (Regression 4)
Coefficients

















Total 2 4 3 9
B. Coefficients
U.S. Japan
<0 1 1 2
0— .5 1 1 2 4
>.5 2 1 3
Total
[
4 2 3 9Table 7
Coefficients of R&D Intensity in TFP Growth Regressions, by Year
















Approximate TFP growth: (percent growth in deflated sales per employee) —
.25(percent growth in gross plant per employee).
All equations contain an additional set of industry dummies and a base
year (1973) size variable.
The AR/S variable is the average of 1972—1974 R&D divided by theaverage
(geometric) 1973 and 1980 sales (both deflated). It is the same
for all years.